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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Case No. 2:16-cr-00046-PAL-GMN

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER

9 v.

(Mot Supp. Resp - ECF No. 971)

10 BRIAN D. CAVALIER,

11 Defendant.

12 Before the court is the Government's Motion to Supplement its Responses to Defendants'
13 Motions to Sever and its Motion to Sever Defendants into Three Tiers for Trial (ECF No. 971)
14 which was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and LR IB 1-3. The
15 court has considered the motion and Cavalier's Response (ECF No. 1043). Cavalier did not file an
16 initial motion to sever, but did respond to the government's severance proposal.

17 **BACKGROUND**

18 **I. The Indictment**

19 Defendant Cavalier and 18 co-defendants are charged in a Superseding Indictment (ECF
20 No. 27) returned March 2, 2016. Cavalier is charged in 11 counts with:

- 21 • Count One – Conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States in violation of 18
22 U.S.C. § 371. This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred sometime between
23 March of 2014 and March 2, 2016.
- 24 • Count Two – Conspiracy to impede or injure a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C.
25 § 372. This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred sometime between March
26 of 2014 and March 2, 2016.
- 27 • Count Three – Use and carry of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of
28 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 2. This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred
sometime between March of 2014 and March 2, 2016.
- Count Five – Assault on a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b) and § 2.
This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred on April 12, 2014.

- Count Six – Use and carry of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 2. This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred on April 12, 2014.
- Count Eight – Threatening a federal law enforcement officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) and § 2. This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred on April 12, 2014.
- Count Nine – Use and carry of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 2. This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred on April 12, 2014.
- Count Twelve – Obstruction of the due administration of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and § 2. This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred on April 12, 2014.
- Count Fourteen – Interference with interstate commerce by extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and § 2. This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred on April 12, 2014.
- Count Fifteen – Use and carry of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 2. This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred on April 12, 2014.
- Count Sixteen – Interstate travel in aid of extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 and § 2. This charge arises from conduct that allegedly occurred sometime between April 5, 2014 and April 12, 2016.

The Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 27) in this case arises out of a series of events related to a Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) impoundment of Cliven Bundy’s cattle following a two-decade-long battle with the federal government. Beginning in 1993, Cliven Bundy continued to graze cattle on land commonly referred to as the “Bunkerville Allotment” without paying required grazing fees or obtaining required permits. The United States initiated civil litigation against Cliven Bundy in 1998 in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The court found that Cliven Bundy had engaged in unauthorized and unlawful grazing of his livestock on property owned by the United States and administered by the Department of the Interior through the BLM. The court permanently enjoined Cliven Bundy from grazing his livestock on the Allotment, ordered him to remove them, and authorized the BLM to impound any unauthorized cattle. Bundy did not remove his cattle or comply with the court’s order and injunction. The United States went back to court. Subsequent orders were entered in 1999 and 2013 by different judges in this district permanently enjoining Bundy from trespassing on the Allotment and land administered by the National Park Service (“NPS”) in the Lake Mead National

1 Recreation Area¹, ordering Bundy to remove his cattle, and explicitly authorizing the United States
2 to seize, remove, and impound any of Bundy's cattle for future trespasses, provided that written
3 notice was given to Bundy.

4 On February 17, 2014, the BLM entered into a contract with a civilian contractor in Utah
5 to round up and gather Bundy's trespass cattle. BLM developed an impoundment plan to establish
6 a base of operations on public lands near Bunkerville, Nevada, about 7 miles from the Bundy ranch
7 in an area commonly referred to as the Toquop Wash. On March 20, 2014, BLM also entered into
8 a contract with an auctioneer in Utah who was to sell impounded cattle at a public sale. Bundy
9 was formally notified that impoundment operations would take place on March 14, 2014. The
10 following day, Bundy allegedly threatened to interfere with the impoundment operation by stating
11 publicly that he was "ready to do battle" with the BLM, and would "do whatever it takes" to protect
12 "his property." The superseding indictment alleges that after being notified that BLM intended to
13 impound his cattle, Bundy began to threaten to interfere with the impoundment operation, and
14 made public statements he intended to organize people to come to Nevada in a "range war" with
15 BLM and would do whatever it took to protect his cattle and property.

16 The superseding indictment alleges that, beginning in March 2014, the 19 defendants
17 charged in this case planned, organized, conspired, led and/or participated as followers and
18 gunmen in a massive armed assault against federal law enforcement officers to threaten, intimidate,
19 and extort the officers into abandoning approximately 400 head of cattle owned by Cliven Bundy.
20 The removal and impoundment operation began on April 5, 2014. On April 12, 2014, defendants
21 and hundreds of recruited "followers" executed a plan to recover the cattle by force, threats, and
22 intimidation. Defendants and their followers demanded that officers leave and abandon the cattle
23 and threatened to use force if the officers did not do so. The superseding indictment alleges armed
24 gunmen took sniper positions behind concrete barriers and aimed their assault rifles at the officers.
25 Defendants and their followers outnumbered the officers by more than 4 to 1, and the potential
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28 ¹ By 2012, Bundy's cattle had multiplied and he also began grazing his cattle on land administered by the
NPS in the Lake Mead National Recreation Area without obtaining grazing permits or paying grazing fees.

1 firefight posed a threat to the lives of the officers, as well as unarmed bystanders which included
2 children. Thus, the officers were forced to leave and abandon the impounded cattle.

3 After the April 12, 2014 confrontation with federal officers, the superseding indictment
4 alleges that the leaders and organizers of the conspiracy organized armed security patrols and
5 check points in and around Cliven Bundy's Bunkerville ranch to deter and prevent any future law
6 enforcement actions against Bundy or his co-conspirators, and to protect Bundy's cattle from
7 future law enforcement actions.

8 **II. Procedural History**

9 Cavalier was initially arrested on April 15, 2016, in the District of Nevada on a Superseding
10 Indictment (ECF No. 27) returned March 2, 2016 and warrant issued in this district. All 19
11 defendants made their appearances in this case in this district between March 4, 2016, and April
12 15, 2016. At the initial appearance of each defendant, the government stated its position that this
13 was a complex case that would require special scheduling review. All 19 defendants are currently
14 joined for trial pursuant to the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act. All 19 defendants have been
15 detained pending trial.

16 In an Order (ECF No. 198) entered March 25, 2016, the court directed the parties to meet
17 and confer as required by LCR 16-1 to discuss whether this case should be designated as complex,
18 and, if so, to attempt to arrive at an agreed-upon complex scheduling order addressing five
19 specified topics for discussion. The order gave the parties until April 18, 2016, to file a stipulated
20 proposed complex case schedule if all parties were able to agree, or if they were not, to file a
21 proposed schedule with supporting points and authorities stating each party's position with respect
22 to whether or not the case should be designated as complex, a proposed schedule for discovery,
23 pretrial motions, and trial, and any exclusions of time deemed appropriate under 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

24 A Proposed Complex Case Schedule (ECF No. 270) was filed on April 18, 2016. In it, the
25 government and 13 of the 19 defendants agreed that the case should be designated as complex.
26 The 13 defendants who stipulated to the proposed schedule included: Cliven Bundy, Mel Bundy,
27 Dave Bundy, Blaine Cooper, Gerald Delemus, O. Scott Drexler, Richard Lovelien, Steven Stewart,
28 Todd Engel, Gregory Burleson, Joseph O'Shaughnessy, Micah McGuire and Jason Woods. Three

1 defendants, Ammon Bundy, Peter Santilli, and Brian Cavalier, indicated that they would “defer
2 the decision to agree or disagree, pending further consultation with counsel and/or have taken no
3 position as to the filing of this pleading.” Three defendants, Ryan Bundy, Eric Parker, and Ryan
4 Payne, disagreed that the case should be designated as a complex case “to the extent time is
5 excluded under the STA.”

6 The same 13 defendants who initially stipulated that the case should be designated as
7 complex, agreed that the May 2, 2016 trial date should be vacated, and that the trial in this matter
8 should be set on the first available trial track beginning “in or around February 2017.” Three
9 defendants, Ammon Bundy, Peter Santilli, and Brian Cavalier, “deferred the decision to agree or
10 disagree about a trial date pending further consultation with counsel, or have not taken a position.”

11 The 13 defendants who stipulated the case should be designated as complex and a trial date
12 set in February 2017, stipulated “that all time from the entry of Defendants’ pleas in this case until
13 the trial of this matter is excluded for purposes of the STA pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)
14 as the ends of justice outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.”
15 Ammon Bundy, Peter Santilli and Brian Cavalier “deferred the decision to agree or disagree about
16 the exclusion of time, pending further consultation with counsel, or have taken no position on the
17 matter.” Ryan Bundy stated he disagreed “to the extent any exclusion of time denies him the right
18 to a speedy trial under the STA.” Eric Parker stated he disagreed “with no further position stated.”
19 Ryan Payne stated he disagreed “with the exclusion of time to the extent it denies him the right to
20 a speedy trial under the STA.”

21 The court held a scheduling and case management conference on April 22, 2016, to
22 determine whether this case should be designated as complex. Eighteen of the nineteen defendants
23 appeared with their counsel. Defendant Ryan Bundy appeared pro se with standby counsel, Angela
24 Dows. At the scheduling and case management conference on April 22, 2016, many of the
25 defendants who had initially stipulated to the complex case schedule and a February 2017 trial
26 date, changed positions. The positions of each of the defendants were stated on the record at the
27 hearing and memorialized in the court’s Case Management Order (ECF No. 321) entered April 26,
28 2016. The court found the case was a complex case within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §

1 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii), and set the trial for February 6, 2017. The case management order made
 2 findings concerning why this case was deemed complex within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §
 3 3161(h)(7)(B), and the court's findings on exclusion of time for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.
 4 The case management order also set deadlines for filing motions to sever, motions for filing pretrial
 5 motions and notices required by Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure², and LR
 6 12(1)(b). No defendant filed objections to the determination that this case was complex, the court's
 7 Speedy Trial Act tolling and exclusion findings, or any other provision of the court's case
 8 management order.

9 **III. The Parties' Positions**

10 **A. The Government's Motion to Supplement**

11 The Government's Motion to "Supplement" (ECF No. 971) acknowledges that the
 12 government filed oppositions to each of the defendants' severance motions, arguing that the nature
 13 of the allegations and charges made this case appropriate for joinder and that defendants had not
 14 shown a joint trial would manifestly prejudice them. *Id.* at 6. The governments' responses
 15 objected to individual trials, and did not propose an alternative to a single 19-defendant trial.³ *Id.*
 16 The government states it took this position because, when it filed its oppositions to the motions to
 17 sever, it was unclear whether all of the defendants would be available for the February 2017 trial
 18 as a number of defendants were also charged in the District of Oregon and awaiting trial. The
 19 charges against the defendants who were also charged in the District of Oregon have now been
 20 resolved, and all of the remaining 17 defendants will be available for the trial set in February 2017.
 21 The government has concluded that there is little likelihood that any more defendants will resolve
 22 their case short of trial. The government therefore seeks leave to submit a supplemental response
 23 to defendants' severance motions and its own request and proposal for severance.

24 The government now argues the court should exercise its inherent authority to manage its
 25 docket and order severance because a joint trial of all 17 remaining defendants would unreasonably
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27 ² All references to a "Rule" or the "Rules" refer to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

28 ³ Two of the 19 defendants, Gerald A. DeLemus and Blaine Cooper, have now resolved their cases by entering guilty pleas.

1 increase the amount of time it takes to try all defendants, result in greater delay, confusion and
 2 difficulty in maintaining an orderly and efficient proceeding. It seeks to align defendants into
 3 proposed groupings of three-tiers for three separate trials:

- 4 • **Tier 1 – Leaders and Organizers:** Defendants Cliven Bundy, Ryan Bundy, Ammon
 5 Bundy, Peter Santilli, and Ryan Payne.
- 6 • **Tier 2 – Mid-level Leaders and Organizers and Follower-Gunmen:** Defendants Dave
 7 Bundy, Mel Bundy, Joseph O’Shaughnessy, Brian Cavalier, Jason Woods and Micah
 8 McGuire.
- 9 • **Tier 3 – Follower-Gunmen:** Defendants Ricky Lovelien, Todd Engel, Gregory Burleson,
 10 Eric Parker, O. Scott Drexler, and Steven Stewart.

11 Citing *United States v. Taylor-Prigge*, 830 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2016) and *United*
 12 *States v. Mancuso*, 130 F.R.D. 128, 130 (D. Nev. 1990), the United States argues that severance is
 13 justified where a joint trial would cause manifest prejudice, or irrespective of prejudice, interfere
 14 with the court’s inherent authority to manage its docket, or both. The government continues to
 15 maintain that there would be “no material prejudice attached to the joinder of the defendants here
 16 because the charged offenses all arise from a common nucleus of operative fact, and because there
 17 is no serious risk of prejudicial ‘spillover’ of otherwise admissible evidence.” However, the
 18 government now seeks severance under the second *Mancuso* factor to allow the district court to
 19 control its docket.

20 The government argues that a single 17-defendant jury trial, which none of the defendants
 21 initially requested, would unreasonably increase the time it takes to try all of the defendants, result
 22 in a greater risk of delay, confusion, and difficulty in maintaining an orderly and efficient
 23 proceeding. The government estimates that a 17-defendant trial would, under the best
 24 circumstances, likely take between 4 and 6 months to complete, and require the government to call
 25 between 60 and 75 witnesses. Cross-examination of each of these witnesses by 17 separate defense
 26 counsel would unreasonably extend the length of the trial. Additionally, a joint trial would likely
 27 result in delays based on scheduling difficulties and conflicts attendant to so large a number of
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1 defendants and their counsel. Under these circumstances, the court may exercise its inherent
2 powers to fashion efficient, smaller trials from an otherwise unwieldy, mass, joint trial.

3 The government continues to maintain that 17 separate trials would also unreasonably
4 increase the total time required to try all defendants. The government estimates that individual
5 trials would take a minimum of 3 to 4 weeks each, requiring the government to call from 30 to 45
6 witnesses to present its case-in-chief for each of the 17 trials, and potentially 17 months to
7 complete all 17 trials. More importantly to the government, separate trials will unreasonably
8 subject victims to being “re-victimized time and again as they are forced to retell the violence and
9 threats of death and bodily injury they faced on April 12, 2014.” The government therefore
10 submits its 3-tier severance plan is an attempt to strike a reasonable balance between these two
11 otherwise unreasonable alternatives.

12 The government argues that its 3-tier proposal groups the defendants in a way that
13 “conforms conceptually to their roles in the conspiracy and aligns with the evidence the
14 government anticipates offering at trial.” The defendants in Tier 1 are the leaders and organizers
15 who were involved in most, or all of the critical events leading to the April 12, 2014 assault. This
16 includes the March 28, 2014 blocking of the BLM convoy; the April 2, 2014 threats and
17 interference with the Utah auction barn; the April 8, 9, and 10, 2014 calls to arms; the April 9,
18 2014 “ambush” of the BLM convoy; the April 9, 2014 threats and interference with the Utah
19 auction barn, the April 11, 2014 threat against the impoundment special agent in charge; and the
20 April 12, 2014 assault.

21 The same is not true of the Tier 3 defendants who are identified as follower-gunmen, whose
22 involvement in the conspiracy is restricted more to their actions during the assault on April 12,
23 2014. Similarly, the Tier 2 defendants are identified as mid-level leaders and organizers whose
24 leadership roles involve their “actions on the ground during the April 12, 2014 assault, and less by
25 their pre-assault activities.”

26 The government expects that at a trial of the Tier 1 defendants, it would offer more
27 evidence of the details of the broader conspiracy and the defendants’ leadership roles in the
28 conspiracy. While evidence of the broader conspiracy is equally admissible against Tier 2 and 3

1 defendants, in separate trials, the government would offer this evidence in summary, rather than
2 in detailed form, simply to provide context for the events of April 12, 2014.

3 The government indicates it is likely to offer more evidence regarding the details of
4 individual movements of Tier 2 and 3 defendants through the wash and over the bridges during
5 the assault to demonstrate their concert of action and intent. By contrast, a trial of the Tier 1
6 defendants would focus less on the individual movements of the gunmen and on-the-ground
7 leaders, and more on the mass movements of the followers against the BLM position. These
8 examples point out the efficiencies that would be gained through a tiered trial presentation of the
9 3 proposed groupings.

10 The government proposes that the cases be tried seriatim, *i.e.*, three trials with intervals of
11 4 to 6 weeks between each trial. The government has proposed the tiers because the Tier 1
12 defendants have the most involvement in the broader conspiracy and therefore, greater culpability
13 and responsibility for the actions charged on April 12, 2014. To invert the order would produce
14 “the anomalous and less fair result of trying less culpable actors before the more culpable ones.”

15 The government anticipates that some of the defendants who are not in Tier 2 or 3 may
16 demand that they be tried following other defendants suddenly complaining that they are not ready
17 for trial in February 2017. If these arguments are made, the government will respond, but argues
18 that the defendant should not be allowed to “game the order of the proposed trials using the speedy
19 trial act”, or through seeking a continuance to accommodate late-in-the-game trial preparation.
20 With respect to the defendants’ anticipated speedy trial arguments, the government cites U.S.C. §
21 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii) which gives the court authority to exclude time on its own motion where the case
22 is “so unusual or complex due to the number of defendants.”

23 **B. Cavalier’s Response**

24 Cavalier initially took no position on the designation of this case as complex and did not
25 initially move to sever. However, in response to the government’s request to separate the
26 defendants into three tiers for three separate trials, he argues this may well create more problems
27 than it solves as many of the defendants vehemently disagree with their placement in the overall
28 conspiracy alleged by the United States. Conspiracy cases present additional problems because it

1 will be challenging, at best, “for a jury to differentiate exactly whom was guilty of exactly what
2 and when.” There will be a strong inclination to lump the defendants together to impute guilt to
3 one which rightfully belongs to another.

4 Cavalier also anticipates unforeseen *Bruton* problems. He opposes being tried with a group
5 of defendants in Tier 2 arguing that the government’s proposal “grossly misstates his role and
6 presupposes his concert of action and movement alongside Defendants with whom he had little or
7 no contact.” Cavalier argues that he is “much more similarly situated” to the defendants in the
8 government’s proposed Tier 1 based on both his physical location during many of the events of
9 April 12, 2014, and his conduct before, during, and after the altercations with the BLM. He
10 characterizes himself as Cliven Bundy’s personal bodyguard who was in close proximity to Mr.
11 Bundy throughout the events of April 12, 2014. He claims he was on the bridge, did not participate
12 in a blocking of any convoy, and was absent for much of the conduct attributable to the Tier 2
13 defendants.

14 The superseding indictment describes his role as a mid-level leader and organizer who
15 recruited and organized gunmen and followers, conducted reconnaissance missions, and provided
16 personal protection for members of the criminal enterprise. These allegations are premised on
17 erroneous information indicating that he recruited and trained gunmen and that he conducted
18 reconnaissance missions. Cavalier states that he had only been in Bunkerville a short time when
19 the events of April 12, 2014 unfolded, and during this entire time “he was attached to the hip to
20 Cliven Bundy, acting as his personal bodyguard and protector.” It would thus stand to reason that
21 he should be tried with Mr. Bundy and the other so-called Tier 1 defendants.

22 DISCUSSION

23 **I. Applicable Law**

24 **A. Rule 8(a): Joinder**

25 Rule 8 permits joinder of offenses or defendants in the same criminal indictment. Rule
26 8(a) allows for joinder of multiple offenses against a single defendant if the offenses are: (i) of the
27 same or similar character; (ii) based on the same act or transaction; or (iii) connected with or
28 constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a); *see also United States v.*

1 *Prigge*, 830 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2016). Rule 8 has been broadly construed in favor of joinder.
 2 *See, e.g., United States v. Lane*, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986); *United States v. Jawara*, 474 F.3d 565,
 3 572 (9th Cir. 2006). The public has a substantial interest in joint trials because they conserve
 4 government funds, minimize inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays
 5 in bringing a defendant to trial. *United States v. Washington*, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1107 (D.
 6 Mont. 2012) (quoting *United States v. Camacho*, 528 F.2d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 1976)). Misjoinder
 7 of charges under Rule 8(a) is a question of law reviewed de novo. *Jawara*, 474 F.3d at 572 (citing
 8 *United States v. Terry*, 911 F.2d 272, 276 (9th Cir. 1990)).

9 Generally, a valid basis for joinder must be discernible from the face of the indictment.
 10 *Jawara*, 474 F.3d at 572–73 (citing *United States v. VonWillie*, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 1995);
 11 *Terry*, 911 F.2d at 276). Mere factual similarity between the events is not a sufficient basis for
 12 joinder. *United States v. Vasquez-Velasco*, 15 F.3d 833, 843 (9th Cir. 1994) (interpreting Rule
 13 8(b) governing joinder of two or more defendants in the same indictment). However, the term
 14 “transaction” is interpreted flexibly, and determining whether a “series” exists depends on whether
 15 there is a “logical relationship” between the transactions. *Id.* “A logical relationship is typically
 16 shown by the existence of a common plan, scheme, or conspiracy.” *Id.* at 844 (internal citations
 17 omitted). A logical relationship may also be shown if the common activity constitutes a substantial
 18 portion of the proof of the joined charges. *Id.*

19 **B. Rule 14: Severance**

20 Rule 14 governs the severance of both defendants and charges. *Id.* at 845. Even where
 21 joinder is proper under Rule 8(a), the court may order separate trials of counts or provide other
 22 relief that justice requires if joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant or the government.” Fed.
 23 R. Crim. P. 14(a). The court’s power to order severance “rests within the broad discretion of the
 24 District Court as an aspect of its inherent right and duty to manage its own calendar.” *United*
 25 *States v. Gay*, 567 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1978). The court’s denial of a motion to sever is
 26 reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Prigge*, 830 F.3d at 1098.

27 The defendant seeking severance bears the burden of showing undue prejudice of such a
 28 magnitude that, without severance, he will be denied a fair trial. *See United States v. Jenkins*, 633

1 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2011). Prejudice may arise where: (a) the jury could confuse and cumulate
 2 the evidence of one charge to another; (b) the defendant could be confounded in presenting his
 3 defenses (*i.e.*, where a defendant wishes to testify in his own defense on one count but not another);
 4 and (c) the jury could erroneously conclude the defendant is guilty on one charge and therefore
 5 convict him on another based on his criminal disposition. *United States v. Johnson*, 820 F.2d 1065,
 6 1070 (9th Cir. 1987). However, if there is a risk of prejudice, the trial court can neutralize the risk
 7 with appropriate jury instructions, and “juries are presumed to follow their instructions.” *See, e.g.*,
 8 *Zafiro v. United States*, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993); *Vasquez-Velasco*, 15 F.3d at 847 (collecting
 9 cases regarding jury instructions concerning compartmentalizing evidence and spillover
 10 prejudice); *United States v. Patterson*, 819 F.2d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir.1987) (severance is
 11 unnecessary when the trial court carefully instructs the jury “because the prejudicial effects of the
 12 evidence of co-defendants are neutralized”).

13 Rule 14 does not require severance even if prejudice is shown; rather, the rule leaves the
 14 tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court’s sound discretion. *Zafiro*, 506 U.S.
 15 at 538–39. The Ninth Circuit has explained that Rule 14 sets a high standard for showing prejudice
 16 “because some prejudice is inherent in any joinder of defendants, if only ‘some’ prejudice is all
 17 that need be shown, few, if any, multiple defendant trials could be held.” *United States v. Vaccaro*,
 18 816 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1987), *abrogated on other grounds by Huddleston v. United States*,
 19 485 U.S. 681 (1988). The test for determining abuse of discretion in denying severance under
 20 Rule 14 is “whether a joint trial was so manifestly prejudicial as to require the trial judge to exercise
 21 his discretion in but one way, by ordering a separate trial.” *Jenkins*, 633 F.3d at 807 (citing *United*
 22 *States v. Decoud*, 456 F.3d 996, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006)).

23 Notably, the Ninth Circuit had acknowledged that a joint trial is “particularly appropriate”
 24 when defendants are charged with conspiracy. *Id.* (citing *Zafiro*, 506 U.S. at 536–37). This is so
 25 “ ‘because the concern for judicial efficiency is less likely to be outweighed by possible prejudice
 26 to the defendants when much of the evidence would be admissible against each of them in separate
 27 trials’.” *United States v. Boyd*, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1212 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting *United States*
 28 *v. Fernandez*, 388 F.3d 1199, 1242 (9th Cir. 2004)).

1 **C. The *Bruton* Rule**

2 In *Bruton v. United States*, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's
 3 Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is violated when a facially
 4 incriminating confession of a non-testifying co-Defendant is introduced at a joint trial, even if the
 5 jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the co-defendant. To violate the
 6 Confrontation Clause, the co-defendant's confession must directly incriminate the objecting
 7 defendant. *Id.* at 126. However, the Supreme Court later held that "the Confrontation Clause is
 8 not violated by the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's confession with a proper limiting
 9 instruction when . . . the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any
 10 reference to his or her existence." *Richardson v. Marsh*, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). In *Richardson*,
 11 the Supreme Court declined to extend the *Bruton* doctrine to "confessions incriminating by
 12 connection." *Id.* at 209.

13 A properly redacted confession of a co-defendant does not violate the Confrontation Clause
 14 if the confession does not refer to the defendant. *Mason v. Yarborough*, 447 F.3d 693, 695–96
 15 (9th Cir. 2006). However, the redacted confession may not reference the co-defendant by
 16 implication, for example, by replacing a name with an obvious blank space or symbol or word
 17 such as "deleted." *Gray v. Maryland*, 523 U.S. 185, 196–97 (1998).

18 In *United States v. Parks*, 285 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit held that the
 19 trial court erred in admitting an improperly redacted confession which included the term "they" in
 20 various places from which the jury could infer the existence of a third accomplice. Parks and co-
 21 defendant Williams were tried and convicted of bank robbery committed by three individuals. Co-
 22 defendant Williams gave a statement to the FBI which was admitted in redacted form at trial.
 23 Williams confessed to the robbery and stated Parks was the individual who collected the money
 24 inside the bank. Although all portions of the statement in which Williams made any reference to
 25 Parks or the two of them acting together were redacted, two sentences contained the word "they,"
 26 indicating at least two other individuals were involved other than Williams. The Ninth Circuit
 27 found that the jury would naturally conclude that Parks was the name redacted from the confession.
 28 "The combination of an obviously redacted statement with the language implying the existence of

1 a third person reasonably could leave the jury to conclude that the unnamed third person must be
 2 the co-defendant before them.” *Id.* at 1139. The court held that admission of Williams’ redacted
 3 statement was error. However, after an exhaustive review of the record it determined that the error
 4 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was substantial evidence of Parks’ guilt.
 5 *Id.* at 1139–40.

6 **D. Antagonistic Defenses**

7 Antagonistic defenses, “or the desire of one defendant to exculpate himself by inculpating
 8 a co-defendant,” is not sufficient to require severance. *United States v. Throckmorton*, 87 F.3d
 9 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing *United States v. Sherlock*, 962 F.2d 1349, 1363 (9th Cir. 1992)).
 10 A defendant will only be entitled to severance based on mutually antagonistic defenses if “the core
 11 of the co-defendant’s defense is so irreconcilable with the core of his own defense that the
 12 acceptance of the co-defendant’s theory by the jury precludes acquittal of the defendant.” *United*
 13 *States v. Cruz*, 127 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting *Throckmorton*, 87 F.3d at 1072); *see*
 14 *also United States v. Tootick*, 952 F.2d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1991) (mutually exclusive defenses
 15 said to exist when acquittal of one co-defendant would necessarily call for the conviction of the
 16 other); *United States v. Hernandez*, 952 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1991) (to obtain severance on
 17 basis of antagonistic defenses, defendant must show that acceptance of one party’s defense will
 18 preclude acquittal of the other party). The district court may also “reduce any potential confusion
 19 between the defendants by instructing the jury that it should evaluate the evidence against each
 20 defendant separately and that the verdict as to one defendant should not control the verdicts of the
 21 others.” *Id.* at 800 (citing *Zafiro*, 506 U.S. at 540–41).

22 **E. Severance for Favorable Testimony from Co-Defendants**

23 A defendant who moves for severance to obtain favorable testimony from a co-defendant
 24 must show the following: (1) he would call the co-defendant at the severed trial; (2) that the co-
 25 defendant would in fact testify; and (3) that the testimony would be favorable to him. *United*
 26 *States v. Jenkins*, 785 F.2d 1387, 1393–94 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing *United States v. Seifert*, 648 F.2d
 27 557, 563 (9th Cir. 1980)); *see also United States v. Mayo*, 646 F.2d 369, 374 (9th Cir. 1981). The
 28 district court then must consider “the weight and credibility of the proposed testimony and the

economy of severance.” *United States v. Castro*, 887 F.2d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 1989). It is insufficient to state that a co-defendant “likely” would offer exculpatory testimony at a separate trial. *Id.* Additionally, it is well settled that “a defendant has no absolute right to elicit testimony from any witness, co-defendant or not, whom he may desire.” *Gay*, 567 F.2d at 919; *United States v. Roberts*, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1974). Any witness may invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify. *Gay*, 567 F.2d at 919.

F. Severance for Judicial Economy

A number of circuit courts of appeal, including the Ninth Circuit, have recognized that the district court has broad discretion to organize the size of its cases in the interest of judicial economy and case management. *See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy*, 564 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1997); *United States v. Casamento*, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151–53 (2nd Cir. 1989); *United States v. Moya-Gomez*, 860 F.2d 706, 754 (7th Cir. 1988). Many district courts have recognized the court’s inherent authority to manage its case load and to sever in the interest of efficient administration of justice and judicial economy. *See, e.g., United States v. Mancuso*, 130 F.R.D. 128 (D. Nev. 1990); *United States v. Gallo*, 668 F. Supp. 736, 754–58 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), *aff’d* 863 F.2d 185 (2nd Cir. 1988), *cert. denied*, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989).

In *Mancuso*, 130 F.R.D. 128, Judge Reed recognized the general rule that defendants jointly indicted should ordinarily be tried together, and that co-conspirators in a conspiracy case should ordinarily be tried together. *Id.* at 130–31. However, his decision thoughtfully reviewed and considered the difficulties of a joint trial in a complex multi-defendant case. The decision pointed out that a complex multi-defendant case is “fraught with problems.” *Id.* at 131. He recognized that a single trial of a complex multi-defendant case imposes enormous burdens on the defendants, defense counsel, prosecutors, jurors, the court, and the judge. *Id.* Dozens of people are required to be in court every day. *Id.* Therefore, the absence of any one person may bring the entire trial to a screeching halt. *Id.* Complex multi-defendant cases involve reconciling the individual calendars of the prosecutors and each defense attorney with the court’s docket. *Id.* Attorneys carrying a full case load have conflicts with other trials, and the longer the case lingers, the more pronounced these conflicts become. *Id.* Judge Reed noted that a lengthy trial of multiple

1 defendants creates a unique hardship on each party involved. Jurors spend months away from their
2 daily lives, defendants are required to endure months of pretrial incarceration before their case is
3 finally adjudicated, and often significant amounts of time-consuming evidence are presented
4 which are unrelated to a particular defendant. *Id.* Attorneys are unable to spend significant time
5 on their remaining cases. *Id.* The court is forced to expend an exorbitant amount of time on a
6 single case, and other litigants must “queue up for the remaining courtrooms.” *Id.* The result is a
7 strain on the court’s docket and unconscionable delays of all other cases. *Id.*

8 *Mancuso* also recognized the personal strain on the trial judge in a long complex case. The
9 trial court is required to make rulings as issues come up which often require frequent adjournments
10 necessitated by unavoidable problems associated with multiple jurors, multiple defendants, and
11 their counsel as well as the witnesses and courtroom personnel who are required to be present at
12 all times. *Id.*

13 **II. Analysis & Decision**

14 The court’s case management order set an early deadline for filing motions to sever
15 because, at the case management conference conducted on April 22, 2016, counsel for Dave Bundy
16 stated he would be filing a motion to sever on behalf of his client. An early deadline was set so
17 that the court could evaluate if there was some consensus among the defendants concerning
18 severance. There was not. In their motions to sever, the defendants argued that the deadline for
19 filing motions to sever was premature because voluminous discovery had been produced by the
20 government shortly before the deadline for filing the motions. Virtually all of the defendants’
21 motions to sever indicated they needed time to review the discovery to provide more specific
22 support for their request to sever. Almost all of the defendants asked for leave to supplement their
23 motions to sever after an adequate time to review discovery. As a result, the court held off deciding
24 the motions to sever the defendants filed.

25 On November 13, 2016, the government filed what it called a “supplement” to its responses
26 to defendants’ motions to sever, and its own motion to sever the defendants into three tiers for
27 trial. *See* ECF No. 971. The government’s supplement and motion to sever was filed shortly after
28 the acquittal of the defendants who were also charged in the Oregon prosecution. It is clear to the

1 court this is no coincidence. Clearly, the government expected a different result. Clearly, the
2 government believed that a different outcome of some or all of the Oregon defendants' case would
3 prompt non-trial dispositions in this case. The government's motion was not timely filed. Payne
4 and counsel for other co-defendants correctly point out that the case management order required
5 the government to comply with the same deadline for filing motions to sever as the defendants.
6 However, virtually all of the defendants stated they were unable to support their motions to sever
7 by the initial deadline because they had not had an adequate opportunity to review the discovery.
8 Virtually all of the defendants asked for leave to supplement their motions to sever after reviewing
9 the government's voluminous discovery. All of the defendants have now had more than six months
10 to review discovery in this case, yet none of the defendants have supplemented their motions with
11 any specific support for severance based on *Bruton* concerns, or antagonistic or mutually exclusive
12 defenses. None of the defendants have met their burden of establishing that they would call a co-
13 defendant in a severed trial, that a co-defendant would in fact testify, and that co-defendant's
14 testimony would be favorable.

15 The defendants are also correct that the government has changed its position regarding
16 severance. In opposing the defendants' motions to sever, the government argued that all 19
17 defendants were appropriately joined for trial and had not shown that a joint trial would be
18 manifestly prejudicial. The government's responses to the various defense motions argued that
19 this was a conspiracy case, and therefore the paradigm case for a joint trial. The government's
20 responses also argued that the defendants had not met their burden of establishing that any *Bruton*
21 issues, mutually exclusive defenses, or antagonistic defenses precluded a joint trial. Similarly, the
22 government argued that none of the defendants had met their burden of establishing that any co-
23 defendant would testify in a severed trial. The government now argues that joinder of all of the
24 defendants was and is still appropriate and has resulted in efficiently getting this case ready for
25 trial. However, the government now argues that a 17-defendant trial would be too unwieldly. The
26 government asks that the court sever the trial into three groups in the interests of judicial economy
27 and efficient case management. The three tiers suggested correspond to what the government
28 believes the individual defendants' roles in the offenses charged in the indictment were. The three

1 groups are: Tier 1 – Cliven Bundy, Ryan Bundy, Ammon Bundy, Peter Santilli, and Ryan Payne;
2 Tier 2 – Dave Bundy, Mel Bundy, Joseph O’Shaughnessy, Brian Cavalier, Jason Woods, and
3 Micah McGuire; and Tier 3 – Richard Lovelien, Todd Engel, Gregory Burleson, Eric Parker, O.
4 Scott Drexler, and Steven Stewart.

5 The defendants have also changed their positions with respect to severance. The majority
6 of the defendants filed motions to sever requesting individual trials. Ammon Bundy and Ryan
7 Bundy argued that all of the Bundy brothers should be tried together. Mel Bundy initially indicated
8 he was not willing to be tried with his other brothers. Now that the government is seeking a
9 severance of this case into three separate trials, the majority of the defendants now want a joint
10 trial. Because the court has already indicated that severance will be ordered, the majority of the
11 defendants want to be tried first. A number of defendants who had previously asked to be severed
12 and tried individually now take the position that being tried on February 6, 2017, outweighs their
13 desire to be severed. Those defendants are Eric Parker, Richard Lovelien, Steven Stewart, Joseph
14 O’Shaughnessy, Micah McGuire, and Jason Woods. Some of the defendants are amenable to
15 going to trial with any group of co-defendants as long as they are in the first group set for trial.

16 In light of the court’s indication that the trial would be severed, Ammon and Ryan Bundy
17 requested in their supplements that they be moved to a later group for trial because they have
18 recently returned from defending themselves in Oregon. Brothers Mel Bundy and Dave Bundy
19 want to go to trial first.

20 Cliven Bundy initially asked the court to sever his case from the trial of all of his co-
21 defendants. His response to the government’s motion to supplement now states the opposite. He
22 now seeks a joint trial. His response to the government’s proposal argues it is the responsibility
23 of the court to ensure a venue for a joint trial of all 17 defendants. He asks the court to prove it is
24 not logistically possible to try all 17 defendants in a joint trial. However, if the court is not going
25 to hold a joint trial, he asks that he be severed and tried last. During oral argument on December
26 9, 2016, counsel for Bundy stated that he was requesting to go last if any severance was ordered
27 because he expects the defendants will be acquitted and he did not want his co-defendants and
28 their families and loved ones to undergo the hardship of waiting for trial.

1 During oral argument on December 9, 2016, counsel for the government argued that the
2 government's proposal was the most logical, would result in judicial economy, and conserve
3 resources. The court inquired of counsel for the government why it would be fair to make the
4 defendants in its proposed Tier 3 wait the longest for trial when these were the individuals the
5 government regarded as least culpable. Counsel for the government responded that the sequence
6 of the trial suggested would, in counsel's view, be most logical and conserve resources because
7 trying the Tier 1 leaders and organizers first would give the court an overview of the entire case.
8 Additionally, trying the Tier 1 defendants first would likely resolve a number of legal issues that
9 could be applied to the defendants awaiting trial. The court inquired whether it made more sense
10 to try the Tier 3 defendants first as the evidence in that case would be narrower than the evidence
11 introduced in the trial of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 defendants. The government responded that it was
12 not "wed" to the sequence of the trials. However, government counsel believed trying the Tier 1
13 defendants first would be most efficient and conserve the most resources.

14 The court also inquired whether two trials, rather than three trials, would be more efficient.
15 The government responded that it would, of course, try the case in the manner in which the court
16 determined the case should be severed. However, the government believed that a joint trial of the
17 Tier 1 and Tier 2 defendants would be cumbersome and involve a large number of limiting
18 instructions that the jury might find confusing.

19 The court will order severance in the interests of judicial economy and efficient case
20 management. The court finds that three trials in the groupings proposed by the government is the
21 most logical and will result in the most efficient manner of trying the 17 defendants awaiting trial
22 in this case. However, the court disagrees with the government that it would be less fair to try the
23 least culpable defendants first. The court will order that the Tier 3 defendants be tried first. These
24 are the defendants the government contends are the least culpable of the 3 groups of defendants.
25 In the absence of any compelling reasons for trying Tier 1 or Tier 2 defendants earlier, it seems
26 more fair to try the Tier 3 defendants first. The trial of the Tier 3 defendants will likely be a shorter
27 trial than the trial of either the Tier 1 or Tier 2 defendants. These defendants are primarily involved
28 with the events on April 12, 2014. They are not alleged to be involved in the broader overall

1 conspiracy, or events before or after April 12, 2014. Trial of the Tier 3 defendants will focus on
2 their individual positions and involvement in the events on April 12, 2014. Evidence of the
3 involvement and actions of those the government alleges are the leaders and organizers of the
4 conspiracy can be presented in more summary fashion in a trial of the Tier 3 defendants.

5 **CONCLUSION**

6 Having reviewed and considered all of the moving and responsive papers in connection
7 with the severance issue, the court agrees that the most logical, efficient, and manageable way to
8 try this case is to separate the defendants into three groups corresponding to their alleged roles in
9 the offenses charged in the superseding indictment.

10 **IT IS ORDERED** that:

- 11 1. The trial of the 17 defendants awaiting trial shall be severed into three groups for three
12 separate trials consisting of:
- 13 a. Tier 1: Cliven Bundy, Ryan Bundy, Ammon Bundy, Peter Santilli, and Ryan
14 Payne;
- 15 b. Tier 2: Dave Bundy, Mel Bundy, Joseph O'Shaughnessy, Brian Cavalier, Jason
16 Woods, and Micah McGuire; and
- 17 c. Tier 3: Richard Lovelien, Todd Engel, Gregory Burleson, Eric Parker, O. Scott
18 Drexler, and Steven Stewart.
- 19 2. The Tier 3 defendants will proceed to trial February 6, 2017.
- 20 3. The Tier 1 defendants will proceed to trial 30 days after the conclusion of the trial of
21 the Tier 3 defendants.
- 22 4. The Tier 2 defendants will proceed to trial 30 days after the conclusion of the trial of
23 the Tier 1 defendants.
- 24 5. All pending severance motions, responses, replies, supplements and joinders are
25 terminated.

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DATED this 12th day of December, 2016.

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